John Ioannidis, “Why Most Published Research Findings Are False,” PLoS Medicine, vol. 2 (2005), pp. 696-701.
Brush up on your statistics and ability to evaluate scientific literature (and those that report on the same).
The major political controversies are bioethics controversies. The basic political decision is which humans are human enough to be afforded protection from the rest of us and how we will provide that protection.
We initially determined that prolonged culture of human ES cells in chemically defined medium (CDM) containing activin A and FGF2 (CDM/AF) maintained their fundamental characteristics (See Supplementary Data). We then tested similar conditions for derivation of pluripotent cells from pre- and post-implantation rodent embryos.
UF researchers identified children recently diagnosed with type 1 diabetes whose families banked their
umbilical cord blood at birth. Most were still producing a small amount of insulin. The researchers then gave seven patients ages 2 to 7 intravenous infusions of stem cells isolated from their own cord blood. (They have since treated an additional four children.) The patients were evaluated for the next two years to measure how much insulin they were making on their own and to assess blood sugar levels and the function of key immune system cells.
In the first six months, they required significantly less insulin — on average 0.45 versus 0.69 units of insulin per kilogram per day — and maintained better control of blood sugar levels than children of comparable age with type 1 diabetes who were randomly selected from the clinic population. The researchers also noted that the children who received cord blood infusions had higher levels of regulatory immune cells in their blood six months after the infusion, on average 9 percent of the total cell volume compared with 7.21 percent at the time of infusion.
“This isn’t a cure-all. We think that giving these cells is essentially providing some immunotherapy and downregulating the autoimmunity these patients have,” Haller said. “Realistically, we hope to protect what’s left of their insulin-production for an extended period of time. We think the immune regulation hypothesis is more likely than the hypothesis that stem cells are forming insulin producing cells on their own.”
The idea would be to intervene and repair any early damage during the “honeymoon period” many patients enjoy — the first several months after diagnosis during which insulin needs are minimal, he added.
"Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed simply because the issues may also be pertinent in an election," Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the majority. "Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor."
Merely being human genetically isn't enough - so what do humans have that makes them protected over all other species? And when do they aquire whatever this is?
"[W]hat do humans have that makes them protected" - from other humans - "over other species," -- while still protecting yourself?
Every being of human origin is a person. A person is not a Homo sapiens with the superadded quality of "personhood." Some, however would attempt to withhold moral worth from human beings unless they "qualify" as persons. The status of "personhood" cannot be conferred by society.
The beginning and continuity of the moral worth of human life are concurrent with human life itself. Human worth begins with the one-cell human embryo and lasts lifelong. A living human being is an integrated organism with the genetic endowment of the species Homo sapiens. . . . Thus a human being, despite the expression of different and more mature secondary characteristics, has genetic and ontological identity and continuity throughout all stages of development from formation of the human being until death.
The pushback began Thursday. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved a must-pass bill for the Labor and Health and Human Services departments that includes permission to use federal funding for embryonic stem cell lines derived after Bush in 2001 banned taxpayer dollars from being used on new studies of that kind. Voting no were Sens. Ben Nelson, D-Neb., Sam Brownback, R-Kan., and Judd Gregg, R-N.H.
The provision, proposed by Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, would allow taxpayer dollars to be spent on research on human embryonic stem cell lines derived prior to June 15, 2007 — moving the date of Bush's August 2001 ban on public funding for such research up by nearly six years. The overall bill now moves to the full Senate for debate later this year.
Research on stem cell lines derived in the interim would be eligible for federal funding. The new provision also would add ethical standards to be used for selecting embryos to be studied using federal funds.
Congress has sent me a bill that would overturn this policy. If this legislation became law, it would compel American taxpayers -- for the first time in our history -- to support the deliberate destruction of human embryos. I made it clear to Congress and to the American people that I will not allow our nation to cross this moral line. Last year, Congress passed a similar bill -- I kept my promise by vetoing it. And today I'm keeping my word again: I am vetoing the bill that Congress has sent. (Applause.)
Destroying human life in the hopes of saving human life is not ethical -- and it is not the only option before us.
But it was March 2006, just months after the South Korean stem-cell scientist Hwang Woo Suk—who had become an international sensation after claiming to have cloned a human embryo, a first—had been exposed as a fraud. As another Asian stem-cell scientist announcing a surprise advance, Yamanaka knew his peers would put him under the microscope. (emphasis mine)
. . . proponents rushed to the microphone to do damage control and claiming we must continue embryonic stem cell research since we can't predict which technique will provide cures. With 1,200 clinical studies underway using adult stem cells and none using embryonic ones as well as these two breakthrough studies in the last year, it is becoming a pretty sure thing on simple pragmatic grounds where we should be putting our tax money. It is like predicting whether the San Antonio Spurs are going to beat your local Saturday afternoon pick up basketball team.
The emperor has no clothes but continues to ride smiling through the public. Sooner or later the people notice."
Ironically, the day this bill passed last fall, the news announced the breakthrough study that showed that amniotic stem cells could become endoderm, ectoderm and mesoderm. They have all the benefits of embryonic stem cells but none of the risks. They don't turn into cancers, they are readily available, genetically stable and easier to control. This year, the ground breaking study on dedifferentiating mouse skin cells into embryonic stem cells hit the front pages and TV screens the same day as the House vote and stole its thunder. Though this technique has a number of hurdles to cross before being applicable in humans, I'm beginning to wonder if God has a great sense of humor!
Is there a plot afoot?
Lots of lobbyists, members of Congress and even a few scientists are starting to think so.
"It is ironic that every time we vote on this legislation, all of a sudden there is a major scientific discovery that basically says, 'You don't have to do stem cell research,' " Democratic Caucus Chairman Rahm Emanuel (Ill.) sputtered on the House floor on Thursday. "I find it very interesting that every time we bring this bill up there is a new scientific breakthrough," echoed Rep. Diana DeGette (D-Colo.), lead sponsor of the embryo access bill. Her emphasis on the word "interesting" clearly implies something more than mere interest.
"Convenient timing for those who oppose embryonic stem cell research, isn't it?" added University of Pennsylvania bioethicist Arthur Caplan in an online column. (The bill passed easily, but not with a margin large enough to override Bush's promised veto.)
Even some scientists, those exemplars of rationality, couldn't help but wonder if somebody, somewhere, was -- if not out to get them -- at least taking some pleasure in irritating them.
"I don't think this is the most sensitive timing for Nature to release these papers," said Harvard stem cell scientist Kevin Eggan, the lead author of one of the articles that appeared in the London-based journal on Thursday.
Twice in six months. What are the odds?
If the person has lost her moral agency/personhood as I argue, then the person who deserved reward is no longer present to receive it. It is the new moral entity, having done nothing, that receives the reward for what someone else did.
Kantian arguments for morally obligatory suicide are
extremely rare. Many believe that Kant thought suicide
was absolutely prohibited conduct, mostly on the grounds
that no agent could consistently will the generalized form
of any suicide maxim based on self-love as a law of nature.
Therefore, according to this interpretation, Kant would
never require someone to kill herself for any reason. However,
there is a plausible interpretation of Kant’s views
that states, under certain conditions, not only is the person
permitted to kill herself; she is required to do so
as a duty to herself qua moral agent. In situations in
which the agent cannot keep both her physical and moral
lives, killing her body preserves her moral life and dignity
as a person. I will first develop the Kantian suicide
duty to the self and then focus on why it pertains to
dementia patients before they lose their moral status as
persons.
...the example most closely related to dementia patients’
loss of moral agency is that of a man bitten by a rabid dog.
As in the case of the patients, the ill man is not responsible
for becoming ill. However, even though he is innocent
of any wrongdoing related to the illness, Kant states that
the man has a duty to take “his life lest he harm others as
well in his madness” (Kant 1797 [1996], 178). There are only
two choices—each of which is bad—open to the rabid individual:
suicide and madness/loss of personhood. For the
latter, the agent not only loses his humanity by becoming
the physical equivalent of a rabid dog, he poses a threat to
others, which in turn could cause them to lose their humanity
if they are also infected. Suicide, on the other hand, is a
duty he has to himself as a being with human dignity. Although
it is likely to cause harm to others due to the loss of
the individual, if performed with the right mental states and
reasons, the taking of his physical life preserves his moral
agency. He chooses to remain a person, instead of allowing
himself to be degraded by having a moral status lower than
that of a rabid dog.
I knew when writing “A Kantian Moral Duty for the Soon to Be Demented to Commit Suicide” that it would cause a great deal of consternation too (sic) many. First, my interpretation of Kant was heavily influenced by Korsgaard’s double-level theory so well explicated in her “The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil (1998).” Second, and most importantly, any challenge to central beliefs on morality, especially when it involves vulnerable populations, always will have this effect. However, I take Mill seriously when he states that:the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind (Mill [1972], 88).
The goal is to understand what others think and argue, and then incorporate the useful parts into a fuller understanding of death duties.
......The position I consider only applies to people when they have dementia causing disease and their full self-hood with its inherent duties to themselves. The need now is to discuss the issue until some practical solutions that respects all those affected are found.
Card (2007) does not merely claim that practitioners are obligated to provide EC; he argues that they are obligated to do so even if they have a conscientious objection. This last clause may seem harmless on the surface, but a closer look reveals that it effectively saws off the limb on which the first clause and all medical ethics sit. To begin, what is a conscientious objection, but an individual’s judgment that it would be unethical for him or her to act in a certain way? A genuine conscientious objection, even if misinformed, is an expression of a commitment to acting morally, and although religious persons are somewhat more likely to report conscientious objections (Curlin et al. 2007), judgments of conscience need not be informed by explicitly religious ideas. Moreover, all ethical arguments are appeals to conscience. As such, acting conscientiously is the most fundamental of all moral obligations.
....
Indeed, the very act of presenting evidence and making arguments presumes that the one to whom those arguments are directed, whether practitioner or juror, is committed to acting according to their best judgment after taking all relevant considerations into account. It would be useless for an attorney to make arguments to jurors if those jurors were not committed to deciding a verdict based on their best judgment of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Likewise, it is useless for Card or anyone else to make ethical arguments if practitioners are not committed to practicing according to their best judgment of what is in fact ethical. A commitment to acting conscientiously is as fundamental to the moral life as a commitment to judging impartially is to the work of a
juror.
Irving Weissman, director of the Stanford Institute for Stem Cell Biology and Regenerative Medicine in California, co-authored a 2007 study with Verfaillie, and said he believes Verfaillie is innocent of any foul play. Verfaillie "has a long record of solid, reproducible work. I can't conceive that, if there is a systematic error, she participated in it," he said.
"Nevertheless at the very least, the markers associated with the cells [in the Nature study] can't be taken as gospel," Weissman continued. In the case of Verfaillie's MAPCs, he said, "it is conceivable that [Verfaillie] found a way of tissue culture isolation of pluripotent cells that was difficult to reproduce."
Nature advance online publication 6 June 2007 | doi:10.1038/nature05934; Received 6 February 2007; Accepted 22 May 2007; Published online 6 June 2007
Generation of germline-competent induced pluripotent stem cells
Keisuke Okita1, Tomoko Ichisaka1,2 & Shinya Yamanaka1,2
1. Department of Stem Cell Biology, Institute for Frontier Medical Sciences, Kyoto University, Kyoto 606-8507, Japan
2. CREST, Japan Science and Technology Agency, Kawaguchi 332-0012, Japan
Correspondence to: Shinya Yamanaka1,2 Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to S.Y. (Email: yamanaka@frontier.kyoto-u.ac.jp).
We have previously shown that pluripotent stem cells can be induced from mouse fibroblasts by retroviral introduction of Oct3/4 (also called Pou5f1), Sox2, c-Myc and Klf4, and subsequent selection for Fbx15 (also called Fbxo15) expression. These induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells (hereafter called Fbx15 iPS cells) are similar to embryonic stem (ES) cells in morphology, proliferation and teratoma formation; however, they are different with regards to gene expression and DNA methylation patterns, and fail to produce adult chimaeras. Here we show that selection for Nanog expression results in germline-competent iPS cells with increased ES-cell-like gene expression and DNA methylation patterns compared with Fbx15 iPS cells. The four transgenes (Oct3/4, Sox2, c-myc and Klf4) were strongly silenced in Nanog iPS cells. We obtained adult chimaeras from seven Nanog iPS cell clones, with one clone being transmitted through the germ line to the next generation. Approximately 20% of the offspring developed tumours attributable to reactivation of the c-myc transgene. Thus, iPS cells competent for germline chimaeras can be obtained from fibroblasts, but retroviral introduction of c-Myc should be avoided for clinical application.
Although ES cells are promising donor sources in cell transplantation therapies1, they face immune rejection after transplantation and there are ethical issues regarding the usage of human embryos. These concerns may be overcome if pluripotent stem cells can be directly derived from patients' somatic cells2. We have previously shown that iPS cells can be generated from mouse fibroblasts by retrovirus-mediated introduction of four transcription factors (Oct3/4 (refs 3, 4), Sox2 (ref. 5), c-Myc (ref. 6) and Klf4 (ref. 7)) and by selection for Fbx15 expression8. Fbx15 iPS cells, however, have different gene expression and DNA methylation patterns compared with ES cells and do not contribute to adult chimaeras. We proposed that the incomplete reprogramming might be due to the selection for Fbx15 expression, and that by using better selection markers, we might be able to generate more ES-cell-like iPS cells. We decided to use Nanog as a candidate of such markers.
Although both Fbx15 and Nanog are targets of Oct3/4 and Sox2 (refs 9–11), Nanog is more tightly associated with pluripotency. In contrast to Fbx15-null mice and ES cells that barely show abnormal phenotypes9, disruption of Nanog in mice results in loss of the pluripotent epiblast12. Nanog-null ES cells can be established, but they tend to differentiate spontaneously12. Forced expression of Nanog renders ES cells independent of leukaemia inhibitory factor (LIF) for self-renewal12, 13 and confers increased reprogramming efficiency after fusion with somatic cells14. These results prompted us to propose that if we use Nanog as a selection marker, we might be able to obtain iPS cells displaying a greater similarity to ES cells.